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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
SEPTEMBER 13, 2002
William H. Rehnquist
I will speak today on the use of military tribunals in the United
States during time of war. I will offer only a historical perspective-
what the Supreme Court has said in the past about the use of these
tribunals.
The use of military tribunals is certainly conceptually different
from the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus allows
someone detained by a government official to have a court inquire
into the basis for the detention, and free someone unlawfully de-
tained. Trial before a military tribunal may result in a sentence to
imprisonment for a long period of time. The availability of habeas
corpus and the use of military tribunals are related because the
method by which a civilian tried before a military tribunal may chal-
lenge the judgment of that tribunal is by habeas corpus.
The use of military tribunals in time of war is but a limited subset
of the subject of civil liberty in wartime. This was never a problem in
the United States until the outbreak of the Civil War. The United
States had been engaged in wars before then-the War of 1812 and
the Mexican War. But the federal government at the time of the War
of 1812 was too feeble to threaten anyone's civil liberties, and the
Mexican War was fought almost entirely in foreign territory.
The Civil War was different. By the time Abraham Lincoln was
inaugurated as President on March 4, 1861, the seven states of the
Deep South had seceded-South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. The Confederacy demanded
that a Union garrison stationed at Fort Sumter, an island in the har-
bor of Charleston, South Carolina, surrender. Lincoln and his cabi-
net debated for weeks whether to give up Fort Sumter, to re-provision
the garrison there, or to try and reinforce it. Finally, on April 12th,
the shore batteries in Charleston Harbor opened fire on Fort Sumter,
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and two days later the Union garrison surrendered. Lincoln called for
75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion.
His action in doing so caused the four states of the upper south,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, to join the other
seven southern states in the Confederacy. This development had dra-
matic logistical consequences for the city of Washington. The frontier
between the Union and the Confederacy was no longer the southern
border of North Carolina, but the Potomac River on which Washing-
ton was located. The nation's capitol went from being an interior city
to a frontier city, subject to attack and even capture by the enemy.
Lincoln was therefore understandably anxious that the troops he
had called for should come quickly from New England, the Mid-Atlan-
tic states, and the Midwest to Washington. But all rail lines leading
from these areas into Washington went through the city of Baltimore,
which was a hotbed of secessionist sympathy. Not only did the rail
lines go through Baltimore, but troops coming from the main line
from Philadelphia and points north and east had to actually change
stations in Baltimore. They could do this either by marching from
one station to another, or by boarding horse cars and being drawn
through the city in that fashion.
On April 19th, detachments of Union troops moving through
Baltimore were stoned by street mobs; the troops fired back, several
soldiers were injured, and several civilians were killed. That night, the
mayor of Baltimore, who was a closet Confederate sympathizer, and
the police chief, who was an open one, gathered together a band of
sympathizers and blew up the railroad bridges leading into Baltimore
from the north.
This action finally pushed Lincoln, at the urging of his Secretary
of State, William H. Seward, to issue a proclamation suspending the
writ of habeas corpus along the rail line from Philadelphia to Washing-
ton. Federal officials then arrested one John Merryman, who was sus-
pected of being one of the principal culprits in the destruction of the
bridges, and imprisoned him at Fort McHenry.
He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and the writ was heard almost
immediately by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney of the Supreme Court of
the United States, sitting as a Circuit Justice in Baltimore. Merryman
argued that because the only reference in the Constitution to the writ
of habeas corpus was in Article I, which dealt with the authority of Con-
gress, the President alone could not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
This one provision is found in Section 9, Clause 2 of the Article and
says:
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The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may
require it.
Taney issued an opinion saying that Merryman was right, and that
the President alone, without Congress, had no authority to suspend
the writ. Since the marshal serving papers in the case had been de-
nied admittance to Fort McHenry, Taney simply sent a copy of his
opinion to Lincoln in late May, 1861.
Lincoln never replied to Taney, but took up the matter in his
address to Congress which he had called into special session on July 4,
1861. He asserted that in an emergency when Congress was not in
session the President had authority to suspend the writ. He went on
to say that the writ, which had been fashioned "with such extreme
tenderness of the citizen's liberty" could, as interpreted by Taney, al-
low "all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself
go to pieces, lest that one be violated."
Lincoln with his usual masterful command of the English lan-
guage thus phrased the basic issue in all discussions of civil liberty in
wartime.
In the following year, Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton issued executive proclamations suspending the writ of habeas
corpus and authorizing not only temporary detention, but also trials of
those held before military commissions instead of civil courts. Two
years later these provisions would be utilized during a time of discon-
tent with the war in the Midwest.
In the summer of 1864, Union authorities in Indiana got wind of
a suspected conspiracy on the part of Southern sympathizers to raid a
government arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois, to free Confederate pris-
oners in a camp near Chicago, and to assassinate Governor Morton of
Indiana. These plans were thwarted when a cache of arms and incrim-
inating correspondence was found in the Indianapolis home of the
state commander of the "Sons of Liberty." At the direction of Secre-
tary Stanton, these defendants were tried, not in the federal court by a
jury, but before a military commission composed of senior Army of-
ficers. After a trial lasting several weeks, the commission found all of
the defendants guilty and sentenced three of them to hang.
By this time-near the end of 1864-Lincoln had won reelection
by a substantial margin, Atlanta had fallen to the Union troops, and
General Sherman was on his way to Savannah. As the end of the war
appeared much closer, public sentiment began to favor leniency, and
Lincoln in a personal meeting with the defendants' lawyers gave them
reason to think that he would in due time commute the sentences.
But then Lincoln was assassinated, and his successor, Andrew John-
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son, ordered the sentences to be carried out. The defendants then
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal cour't in Indianapolis, and the
case went to the Supreme Court under the name of Ex Parte Milligan.
The government's case was badly argued by the Attorney Gen-
eral, James Speed; his principal qualification for the job seems to have
been that he was the brother of a close friend of Lincoln's from Ken-
tucky. His primary argument before the Court was that the Constitu-
tion applied only in peacetime, not in wartime. This contention was
unanimously rejected by the Court, and got the government off on
the wrong foot. Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, shortly before the
Court was to hear argument in the case, wrote to his brother-in-law:
This session of the Court has developed [Speed's] utter want of abil-
ity as a lawyer-he is certainly one of the feeblest men who has ad-
dressed the Court this term.
Other attorneys for the government were better, but they did not
match the battery of talent on the other side. Jeremiah Black made a
superb argument. One of his sallies questioned why soldiers should
sit as judges in cases like this:
No law has bestowed the right upon Army officers more than upon
other persons. If men are to be hung without that legal trial which
the Constitution guarantees to them, why not employ commission-
ers of clergymen, merchants, manufacturers, horse dealers, butch-
ers, or drovers, to do it? It will not be pretended that military men
are better qualified to decide questions of fact of law than other
classes of people; where it is known to the contrary, that they are, as
a general rule, least of all fitted to perform the duties that belong to
a judge.
The opinions of the Court were handed down in December,
1866-nearly a year-and-a-half after the cessation of hostilities-and a
majority of the Court held that civilians could not be tried by military
commissions outside the theater of war where the civil courts were
open for business. The four concurring Justices agreed that the trial
of these prisoners by military courts was unauthorized, but criticized
the majority for saying that Congress could not have authorized it had
it chosen to do so.
Let us now move forward to World War II. There are at least a
few people here who, like me, are old enough to remember back to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Since the
war began for the United States with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor,
and Hitler's declaration of war, there was strong support for the war
effort across the political spectrum in this country. It was "the good
war," as Studs Terkel termed it. Fourteen million people were in the
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armed services; on the home front there were sacrifices, and slogans
such as "Buy Bonds" and "A Slip of the Lip May Sink a Ship." Even
restaurants got into the act, with the slogan "Food Will Win the War."
On this sign at one restaurant, a dissatisfied customer scrawled 'Yes,
but how can we get the enemy to eat here"?
In June of 1942, six months after Pearl Harbor, Richard Quirin
and seven other members of the German armed forces were secretly
put ashore in the United States. They had been trained in the use of
explosives and secret writing at a sabotage school near Berlin. Four of
the saboteurs were transported by German submarine to Amagansett
Beach on Long Island, New York. They landed under cover of dark-
ness, carrying a supply of explosive and incendiary devices, including
time delay detonators disguised as fountain pens. At the moment of
the landing they wore German uniforms, but immediately afterwards
they buried their uniforms on the beach and went in civilian dress to
New York City. The remaining four who had been trained at the sabo-
tage school were taken by another German submarine to Ponte Vedra
Beach, Florida. They went through the same procedures as those who
landed on Long Island, and proceeded to Jacksonville in civilian
dress; all had been instructed to destroy war industries in the United
States. After one of the saboteurs turned himself in, the other seven
were ultimately arrested by the FBI in New York or Chicago.
The decision to try the saboteurs before a military commission
was not made immediately. When FBI agents interrogated the sabo-
teurs, the agents assumed the prosecutions would take place in civil
courts. But as the government's lawyers began to look into criminal
prosecution in the civil courts, they realized that the saboteurs might
face a maximum sentence of only two years in prison for conspiracy to
commit sabotage. Under the law of war they could face the death
penalty. A public trial would also expose the apparent ease with
which the eight were landed on U.S. beaches. And if it came out that
the FBI only caught them so quickly because one of the men turned
himself in, the Germans might be encouraged to try again. Without a
public trial, the Germans would believe that the FBI managed to dis-
cover and arrest the saboteurs almost immediately.
On the advice of Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed a
military commission to try Quirin and his cohorts for offenses against
the laws of war and the Articles of War enacted by Congress. The
Executive Order establishing the commission also directed that the
defendants have no access to civil courts. The trial took place on the
fifth floor of the Department of Justice Building. Attorney General
Biddle himself prosecuted the case. The lawyers assigned to represent
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the saboteurs included Colonel Kenneth Royall, who later served as
the last Secretary of War and the first Secretary of the Army, and Ma-
jor Lauson Stone, son of Chief Justice Harlan Stone.
While they were being tried by the military commission, seven of
the saboteurs petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for
review of the procedures under which they were being tried. The Su-
preme Court convened in a special term on July 29, 1942, to hear
arguments in their case.
One of the principal arguments made by counsel for the petition-
ers was that the civil courts throughout the United States were open at
the time, there had been no invasion of any part of the country, and
therefore under the Milligan case there could be no resort to trial by a
military commission. Counsel noted that one of the petitioners, Her-
bert Haupt, had been born in the United States and was a United
States citizen. At the conclusion of the arguments in the case, and
after deliberation, the Court on July 31st announced its disposition of
the case upholding the government's position, but its full opinion did
not come down until October 1942.
On August 3, the military commission convicted all eight and sen-
tenced each of them to death by electrocution. On August 8, Presi-
dent Roosevelt announced that he had granted clemency to two of the
saboteurs, commuting their sentences to terms in prison. The other
six were executed that day.
The opinion explaining the Court's action in allowing the sabo-
teurs to be tried by a military commission was written by Chief Justice
Stone and issued on October 29, 1942. In it, the Court sharply cut
back on the dicta in the Milligan case, saying that even though the
civil courts were open, and even though it was assumed that one of the
German soldiers was a United States citizen, these defendants could
nonetheless properly be tried and sentenced by a military
commission.
We now come to the third case involving the use of military tribu-
nals in the United States. Hawaii was placed under martial law within
days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and remained under that re-
gime until the autumn of 1944. A few hours after the attack on Pearl
Harbor, Joseph Poindexter, the Territorial Governor of Hawaii, issued
a proclamation placing the territory under martial law and sus-
pending the writ of habeas corpus. He then requested Lieutenant Gen-
eral Walter Short, Commanding General of the Military Department
of Hawaii, to exercise all powers normally exercised by the Governor
and by the territorial judges. On December 8th, Short sent to the
Chief Justice of the Territorial Supreme Court an order which the
latter duly signed. It said:
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Under the direction of the Commanding General, all courts of the
territory of Hawaii will be closed until further notice.
And so they were.
It seems that the drafters of this order had read the Milligan case
quite literally: if military tribunals could not try civilians so long as the
civil courts were open, by implication if the civil courts were closed
military tribunals could try civilians. They did not reason further to say
that the basis for closing the civilian courts must have been some
threat of military force-a threat which surely obtained in Hawaii im-
mediately after Pearl Harbor, but was almost entirely gone after the
Battle of Midway in June, 1942. Yet martial law remained in effect
until the autumn of 1944, when it was lifted by Presidential
proclamation.
Provost courts, composed of officers appointed by the military
governor, tried criminal cases. Lloyd Duncan, a civilian shipfitter, was
charged with assaulting two military guards at the Pearl Harbor Navy
yard, where he worked. He was tried by a provost court and sentenced
to six months in jail. Harry White, a stockbroker, was charged with
having embezzled funds from a client-surely an offense as far re-
moved from considerations of public order or security as one can im-
agine. He was tried by a provost court and sentenced to four years in
prison. Both of the defendants challenged their convictions by habeas
corpus in the federal courts.
When their cases finally reached the Supreme Court, a majority
of the Court in the case of Duncan v. Kahanamoku held that extension
of martial law so long after the threat of invasion had ceased was ille-
gal. Chief Justice Stone commented in a concurring opinion that if
the bars and restaurants could be reopened within two months after
Pearl Harbor, it was hard to see why the courts should not have been
able to reopen a full year later. The good news for the defendants,
and perhaps for the people of Hawaii, was that martial law was illegal
there at the time these defendants were tried-in 1943. The bad news
was that they did not find out about it until February, 1946-half a
year after the end of the war with Japan, and nearly two years after
martial law had been terminated by Presidential proclamation.
In re Yamashita also involved a habeas petition-in this case filed
by Commanding General Yamashita of the Imperial Japanese Army in
the Philippine Islands. General Yamashita had surrendered to the
United States Army in the Philippines on September 3, 1945, and on
September 25 was charged with violating the law of war by failing to
prevent his troops from committing atrocities against civilians and
prisoners of war.
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Less than two weeks later, on October 8, Yamashita was served
with a bill of particulars specifying sixty-four crimes committed by his
troops. A supplemental bill, alleging fifty-nine additional charges, was
filed on October 29, the day Yamashita's trial before a U.S. military
tribunal in the Philippines began. The tribunal denied a defense re-
quest for a continuance to prepare to defend against the new charges.
The trial lasted until December 5. On December 7, Yamashita was
convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.
After the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied his
habeas application, Yamashita filed a habeas petition and a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. At that time,
the Philippine Islands were under the authority of the United States-
the independent Republic of the Philippines was not established until
July 4, 1946-and the Supreme Court of the United States had juris-
diction to hear certain appeals from the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
Yamashita argued on various grounds that the military tribunal
lacked jurisdiction to try him, but his main contentions were that he
could not be tried by a military tribunal after hostilities had ceased
and that the tribunal's procedures for conducting the trial, particu-
larly in admitting evidence, denied him due process.
Many have criticized the proceedings of the tribunal, arguing that
the tribunal merely went through the motions in order to produce a
predetermined outcome. The defense was given virtually no time to
prepare and General Yamashita was seen as a scapegoat who had no
chance to receive a fair trial. The trial seemed to be tailored for maxi-
mum media coverage-including the timing of the announcement of
the verdict on the fourth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor.
The Court, however, found against Yamashita on all of his claims.
In an opinion that relied heavily on Ex Parte Quirin, Chief Justice
Stone emphasized the narrow scope of the Court's review, to "con-
sider... only the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner
for the offense charged." Justice Murphy, who had served as gover-
nor-general and then high commissioner of the Philippine Islands
prior to his appointment to the Court, and Justice Rutledge dissented,
concluding that Yamashita had been denied "the fair trial our Consti-
tution and laws command."
Looking at these four examples of the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of military tribunals, one is reminded of the Latin maxim inter
arma silent leges-in time of war the laws are silent. The first of them,
Ex Parte Milligan, rejecting the use of military tribunals, was decided a
year-and-a-half after the end of the Civil War. The second of them,
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upholding the use of military tribunals, was decided in the dark days
of the summer of 1942, when the fortunes of war of the United States
were just beginning to recover from their lowest ebb. The United
States Navy had suffered serious damage to its fleet at Pearl Harbor,
and Japanese troops invading the Philippines had pushed the United
States troops back onto the Bataan Peninsula, resulting in the grisly
Bataan death march. In North Africa, German forces had recaptured
Tobruk and were within striking distance of Cairo, threatening the
entire Mid-East. In the Battle of Midway, which occurred about this
time, the United States Navy decisively defeated the Japanese Navy,
but this fact was not then known to the general public. Yamashita was
decided just after the war had ended, and involved the military's au-
thority to punish a Japanese general accused of allowing gruesome
atrocities to be committed against civilians by those in his command.
In Duncan, the decision, as I have said, came down not only after the
war had ended but also after martial law had ended.
These cases suggest that while the laws are surely not silent in
time of war, courts may interpret them differently then than in time of
peace.
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